Wednesday, November 17, 2010

Venture Coinvestment Map

It was a grand plan. I was going to learn all sorts of new things: Pentaho, R, Processing. All sorts of new things. In the end, I got caught up in getting something done and learned none of those things. Again.

Using trusty old Python with the beautiful NetworkX module and the shockingly fast--if a bit rough around the edges--graph visualization tool Gephi, I pulled Crunchbase data to create a social network map of how venture investors coinvest. You can skip straight on down if you want, playing with it is more fun than reading about it (and more fun than learning Pentaho, it turns out.)

I can't believe Crunchbase didn't rate limit me* but most of the data is from their excellent database. I augmented it with info individuals have made available on AngelList. I didn't include any non-public info, even though I know of several excellent angels who didn't make the map because they've kept their activities under the radar.

I then had way too many nodes to make any visualization make any sense. So I did two things: any person mentioned as an investor who was also a venture firm employee was folded into the firm. I also made some fixes I knew of (merging my friend Roger Ehrenberg's IA Capital into IA Ventures, for instance.) I know some venture partners invest as angels outside their firms, but since this is a map of social connections, I think the step not only makes sense, but weights individuals more accurately. (Roger Ehrenberg, for instance, would not get the weight his activities deserve if his investing activity was split among three entities.)

Then, again to make it manageable, I took out any investors with fewer than five investments. Ran it through Fruchterman-Reingold. Colored venture firms red, people green and others (corporates, incubators) blue. Made node size proportional to number of investments.

The result is below, in Zoom.it. Some things that stand out:

- The network is incredibly connected. If you go into the "core", where the Sand Hill Road firms are, there are so many edges, they are indistinguishable. Generally, in this visualization, the drawn edges are more or less decorative, because there are too many to have them make sense.

- Because of the dense interconnectivity, there are not many noticeable subnetworks, from 50,000 feet. Here's a map key, such as it is, showing some areas that are distinguishable. The separation between biotech and the core is no more noticeable, to my eye, than that between web 2.0 and the core. I do find that the further I get from my own node, the less I know about the investors.

Map key:

I should note the usual caveats.  Crunchbase data is not a complete record of investment activity, in fact it tends to be severely self-selecting.  I assume both non-US and non-Internet-tech are underrepresented.  I know non-VC investment is underrepresented.  Also, my few fixes are not all-encompassing.  This was a project I had time for because of a couple of long train rides.  I do have the raw dataset (both gephi, graphml and pickled networkx graphs) for the entire network.  If you want them, let me know.

Drag and zoom.  Find your friends.



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* Or maybe because I was hitting their API while on the Acela, they figured it couldn't possibly be programmatic. In any case, to my fellow train passengers, I apologize for hogging the bandwidth.

Thursday, September 30, 2010

OPM

I think Chris Dixon is one of the smartest investors around.  I co-invested in him when he was an angel and I've co-invested with his early stage fund, Founder's Collective.  But while I generally agree with his recent post on venture investing segmentation, I need to call bull on this:

What we are witnessing now is a the VC industry segmenting as it matures. Mentorship and angel funding are performed more effectively by specialized firms.
It's kind of surprising to me that someone who did such an excellent job as an angel would imply that he really wasn't the best investor for those companies in the first place but, hey, he's entitled to his opinion.  But saying you'd be a better angel if you were a firm is like saying that you'd be a better amateur athlete if you went pro*.  You can't be an angel if you have a fund.  And though this sounds like a semantic argument, it make a real-world difference to entrepreneurs.

What bothers me is the lumping of angel motivation and technique in with the "Super-Angel"/micro-VC motivations and techniques.  The otherwise excellent David Lerner makes this mistake when he says he intends to explicate the angel investing world and then lists, as half his angels, people with funds.  This is a fundamental analytical mistake: taking the average of a bimodal distribution tells you nothing very interesting at all.

There are reasons why angels existed in the first place.  While the lower cost of getting a startup from A to B has changed the dynamics of early stage rounds, it hasn't changed most of the fundamental advantages of having individuals investing their own money: a personal--rather than institutional--connection to entrepreneurs, the ability to make quick decisions, the ability to make decisions that may not seem fiduciarily responsible but are for the greater good, primary expertise in an industry and in company building rather than in money-management, etc.  Most importantly--despite what the Supreme Court may think--firms are not people and they don't, in the long run, act like people.  Angels do.

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* While this is the reasoning behind the modern Olympics and many college football programs, it flies in the face of the actual meaning of "amateur" and destroys what makes amateur athletics so appealing. 

Friday, September 24, 2010

It's not about the founders, it's not about the money. It's about what you're building.

I spent my Summer thinking about how I could continue to be useful as an angel investor.  Then this Angelgate thing happened and I can't seem to write the post I meant to write about it.  So I'm writing this instead, hoping to get some thoughts out of my head and move on.  I don't think I'm saying anything new here and this is just a distraction from real work, and I've allocated time as such, so forgive the disjointed style.

1. "Judean People's Front?  We're the People's Front of Judea.  Judean People's front, caw...  The only people we hate more than the Romans are the fucking Judean People's Front."  Every successful revolution is the same, cold comfort though it is, the most vehement feelings are directed towards people working towards the same goals in different ways*.   We're all on the same side and we all want the same thing: more and better startups.

2. Venture investment today is far preferable to every other system of financing innovation we've ever had.  It's not perfect, or even great, but it's far better than what was.  The financing of innovation has improved, in fits and starts, for the last five hundred years.  Think about how the early explorers were funded, think about how the Wright brothers were funded, think about how the second industrial revolution was funded.  For goodness sakes, think about how internet startups were funded fifteen years ago.  The new VC model is better.  The new angel model is better.  Should we make it better still?  Of course.  Should we talk about just chucking it all?  No.

3. It's better for entrepreneurs, but that's not the driving force here.  The entrepreneurs and investors are both bit players in a bigger show.  I tend to disagree with Jon that founders come first, although the why of my disagreement may seem a bit like theological hair-splitting.  Founders don't come first, the idea does.  If a founder thought it was all about them rather than what they were building, I wouldn't invest.  That said, no one works on building something as hard or as smart as the person whose idea it was.  I back ideas, but I believe in founders.  I believe in them because they believe in their idea.  But this semantic distinction leads to a fundamental difference: I'm not doing this to make founders rich, I'm doing it to see good ideas turn into great companies.  When this happens, the founders tend to make a lot of money, but that's a second order effect.

4. Likewise, investors make money.  But startup investors aren't in it for the money: the return on investment is also a second-order effect.  That said, investors need to make money; if they don't, they don't get to invest anymore.  That's true when you invest other people's money, but it's also true for angels.  I have a significant chunk of my money invested or earmarked for startups.  If I lose it, I won't be able to invest anymore.  If I make money, I get to reinvest it.  Not a week goes by when I don't wish I could invest in more companies or invest more in a company that no one else believes in yet.  But not a day goes by when I don't think about the gambler's ruin.

5. Seed-stage VCs are not in it for the money, not in itself.  Angels even less so.  No one on the Forbes 400 list made it there by dint of venture investing.  No one.  [Edit, 9/25/10: Should have checked first... John Doerr and Michael Moritz are both on the list, both by dint of their investment in Google.]  Venture investors aren't robber barons, they don't make the cut.  Think about the economics of a First Round Capital... a fund structured that way won't make the partners much more than minimum wage unless it's one of the top-performing funds in the world.  Any world-class investor would have made a multiple of what they made if they had been a world-class entrepreneur.  VCs have a lower beta, it's in the nature of what we do, but we're all on the same risk-reward curve.  The startup world is a choose your own beta kind of world.  Don't get pissed off when someone chooses a different one.

I'm not defending anyone and I'm not downplaying what happened (whatever did happen... I wasn't there.)  But if one of the guys in that restaurant likes you enough to gives you a valuation, I guarantee you that you can find a less well-known investor who will give you a higher one.  There is no collusion that could affect your outcome.  I doubt there is anyone who believes otherwise.  So I think the anger about this is really a pent up anger about the startup finance system altogether.  I've been an entrepreneur, I've raised money for a startup, and I realize how bad that process sucks, how random and uninformed it all feels.  We have to keep working at and looking for ways to improve it.  But let's not forget that we are all on the same side and we all want the same thing: for startups to have a better chance at success.

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* Of course, in this case there's been no anti-bolshevik league-like purges, no ice picks in the back of the head, no duels at dawn in Weehawken.  Well, not yet anyway.

Monday, August 9, 2010

Online Ad Tech Curriculum: Links

[I am going to make additions/changes to the list by editing the post itself.  I think that's better than cluttering everyones' feed.]

A VC friend asked what he should read to better understand the online advertising market.  At the time I thought I could offer some decent advice.  But as I started to think about it I realized that the stuff you need to know to know how this stuff works is scattered all over the place.  Simple things--like a flowchart of how an ad is delivered to someone visiting a site, complete with multiple ad servers, redirects, etc.--I can't find.

So I figured I'd start making a list.  It's nowhere near complete.  In fact, it's sort of off-the-cuff.  I could use some help improving it.  If you were going to point someone to a few resources that would improve their knowledge of the fundamentals--not the news, not the opinion--of the online ad business, what would they be?

In no particular order.

Books and articles:
Randall Rothenberg, Where the Suckers Moon: The Life and Death of an Advertising Campaign (link to Amazon)
The book to read on the messy details of how an ad campaign gets made with all the wacky interplay between agency and client.

Mark Tungate, Adland: A Global History of Advertising (link to Amazon)
The other day someone tried to tell me just how little I knew about the history of the agency world.  Upon pressing him, I learned he got all his info from watching Mad Men.  I told him to read this book.

Dean Donaldson, Online Advertising History (PDF)
A good--if woefully incomplete--history of online advertising.  And the only one I could find out there.  Part of Donaldson's master's degree program.

Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising (PDF)
What does advertising do and what is its societal purpose?  Bagwell provides a nice survey of the various academic work over the years.  In the end you might be underwhelmed by how little we know, but there it is.

Demetrios Vakratsas; Tim Ambler, How Advertising Works: What Do We Really Know? (JSTOR link, unfree*.)
If Bagwell is top-down, this is bottom-up.  Various cognitive models of advertising.

Gerard Tellis, Advertising's Role in Capitalist Markets (PDF)
I think it's important to note that advertising is a necessary part of our economic system.  If it were not, it would not be much use thinking about it.

Core Online Ad Enabling Technologies:
Cookies:
Cookies are one of the core technologies used in web advertising. 
GoverningWithCode.org, Cookies (PDF)
Flash Cookies Explained (HTML)


Ad Servers:
Understanding ad serving is one of the trickiest parts of understanding the online ad infrastructure. 
Eric Picard, Ad Serving 101, Revised (HTML)
Pointed to this by Ian Thomas, below, but his link is broken.

Why do Publishers and Marketers have Separate Ad Servers? (HTML)
There's more to it than this, but it's a start.

Ad Tags:
Operative's Blog on Ad Tags (HTML)
How to Read Doubleclick Ad Tags and Ad Tag Variables (HTML)

Promotional material:
OpenX White Papers
Pubmatic White Papers
In general I find industry whitepapers to be self-serving.  Doesn't mean you can't learn something from them, though.  These two companies have some informative stuff.

Terry Kawaja/GCA Savvian, Display Advertising Technology Landscape (PDF)
DeSilva+Phillips Online Ad Networks: Monetizing the Long Tail (PDF)
DeSilva+Phillips Ad Exchanges, RTB, and the Future of Online Advertising (PDF)
Investment Bank whitepapers.  When these reports are good, they're invaluable in their industry coverage.

Government Scrutiny:

FTC, Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising (PDF)
The Office of Fair Trading Online Targeting of Advertising and Prices (PDFs)
Some of the most informative publicly available industry coverage is in the reports prepared for government agencies looking at whether and how to regulate.

Blogs:
Bloggers are flaky and difficult people who write about whatever they please whenever they please.  Um, present company excepted.  So, instead of plugging blogs, some posts I think are worth reading.  All of these are from bloggers in my feed.  They're not all the bloggers in my feed, of course, but posts specific to this discussion.

Jay Weintraub, Risk, Arbitrage, and The Root of (Much) Evil
Ian Thomas, Online Advertising 101 series
Mike Nolet, RTB Part I (and parts Ia, Ib, II, III)
Jonathan Mendez, The True Media Value Delta
Brent Halliburton, The Chaos of Second Price Auctions
Greg Hills, Shouldn't It be Cheaper if I Buy More?
Darren Herman, Advertising to Audiences

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* If you head to your library, and they have access to JSTOR, you can get it for free.

Friday, August 6, 2010

The future of free media

Monday's Wall Street Journal article on cookie tracking was a bit underwhelming. So although (a) we've been having the same conversation over and over again since 1996 without getting anywhere*, (b) the article was a bit misleading and maddeningly vague, and (c) industry rumor has it that the church/state divide at the Journal does not quite live up to the J-school ideal, I am siding with Jeff Jarvis in believing that News Corp is not well enough organized to stage a conspiracy: the article was just poorly done.

These arguments are nominally about privacy. And providing privacy is a worthy but complicated** goal. But given the general level of philosophical confusion about privacy, I believe much of the commentary (and the comments to the commentary) is motivated by a hostility to advertising in general.

If you hate advertising, you hate advertising. Arguing that not paying for music means a diminished supply of quality music does not sway the downloader. Not paying for media--in whatever sense of pay--means a diminished supply of quality media. This argument does not sway the hater of advertising, but I'm not trying to convince them. Advertising provides something important: free (as in beer) media. This may not mean much to Rupert Murdoch--who can afford to pay cash for his media--but it means something to society. And it should mean something to those of us who are trying to find a way to make quality ad-supported online media a viable proposition.

Paying cash for media is regressive. High cover prices exclude those with less disposable income. (This strategy is used purposefully by mixed-model high-end media outlets to produce a demographic appealling to better-paying advertisers.) Advertising democratizes media***. And media allows a democracy.

Online media is suffering. Susan Athey and Joshua Gans say "the adoption of targeting... leads to higher impression prices, higher profits, and higher social welfare." Online media is in dire need of profits, much less higher profits. The alternative to targeting is the pay-wall. The FTC, in thinking about targeting, needs to seriously weigh the regressive impact of limiting advertising against the opinion of news outlets like the Wall Street Journal, who have consciously set out to exclude those who don't have a spare $363 per year to spend on something they can get elsewhere for the nuisance cost of seeing a few ads.

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* i.e., The Financial Times, February 12, 1996, "This Bug in Your PC is a Smart Cookie"; and San Jose Mercury News, February 13, 1996, "Web 'Cookies' May be Spying on You."
** If you can quickly and simply articulate what privacy is and why it is important, I will quickly and simply point you to a counter-example. Privacy is not a single thing, it seems more like a bundle of things, so it defies easy analysis.
*** A fact evidenced by laws compelling certain content to be aired "free." This content, naturally, is usually sporting events, but that's a rant of a different color. Hansen & Kyhl "Pay-per-view broadcasting of outstanding events: consequences of a ban" talks about the EU directive of 1989.

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

Startup R&D has replaced corporate R&D

I have a problem with Yves Smith's and Rob Parenteau's op-ed in the Times:

Over the past decade and a half, corporations have been saving more and investing less in their own businesses... Since 2002, American corporations on average ran a net financial surplus of 1.7 percent of the gross domestic product—a drastic change from the previous 40 years, when they had maintained an average deficit of 1.2 percent of G.D.P. ... To show short-term profits, they avoid investing in future growth...
Smith and Parenteau evidently believe that since 1995 corporations have spent less on R&D, stifling innovation.   But, on the face of it, there has been plenty of innovation since 1995.  What gives?

Steven Kaplan and Josh Lerner say in their recent It Ain't Broke: The Past, Present and Future of Venture Capital:
Beginning in the early 1990s... American corporations began fundamentally rethinking [internal R&D facilities]... relying much more heavily on what has been termed "open innovation," i.e., alliances and acquisitions of smaller firms... venture-backed firms are approximately three times as efficient in generating innovations as corporate research.
Corporations are spending less on internal R&D.  But this is because internal R&D is far less efficient than buying venture-backed companies.  Smith and Parenteau forget that Savings = Investments.  When a corporation saves money, it invests it somewhere else.  Sometimes in something innovative.

Smith and Parenteau recommend
[Creating] incentives for corporations to reinvest their profits in business operations... impose an aggressive tax on retained earnings that are not reinvested within two years...  At the same time, the federal government must continue to encourage investment in the economy—ideally by creating incentives for investments in national priorities, like new energy technologies. 
This is exactly wrong.  Corporations should save money or distribute it to their shareholders to save.  That money should be turned into investment in innovative new firms that the corporations can later acquire.  And as to the government steering investments: if corporate-backed R&D is three times worse than venture-backed R&D, I can't even imagine how bad government-directed R&D is.

More investment does decrease consumption in the short-term*, and this is a problem during a downturn.  But because investment increases income growth, it increases the opportunity to consume longer-term.  It might well be that this is the wrong moment in time to encourage savings over consumption, but to create a policy that would discourage more productive investment for years to come makes absolutely no sense.

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* GDP = private consumption + gross investment + government spending + (exports − imports)

Thursday, June 24, 2010

The last days of the ad exchange

Darren Herman wants a conflict-free ad exchange. So do I. We assume there could be one because we look at the much bigger and more efficient financial markets and see they are run on exchanges. But, in reality, the financial world has moved on from exchanges, and so will the ad world.

An article of faith: markets inevitably evolve from inefficient middlemen/arbitrageurs to efficient, transparent and fair crossing platforms. From Bazaar to Exchange. And then they live happily ever after.

But wait, consider this: of the buy and sell orders UBS handles in NASDAQ-listed stocks, it sends less than 5% to an exchange. The rest it internalizes (the infamous "dark pool"). That is, UBS matches buyers and sellers of stocks amongst their own brokerage customers.

Brokerages avoid exchanges. Instead, these days they tend to either be market-makers, internalizing as much of their trading as possible, or sell their order flow to third-party market makers, like Knight Trading*.

Internalization allows brokerage firms to minimize exchange fees, keep the bid-ask spread for themselves, and avoid giving information to competitors. Internalization does not provide transparency and fairness, like an exchange does, and that is part of its draw for the market-makers. Putting your orders into the exchange, where everyone can see them, is like a poker game where everyone else can see your cards. Exchanges level the playing field, and if you're smarter than average, you dislike level playing fields**.

Exchanges were the best way to minimize transaction costs when communication was cheap but computing power was expensive. That time is past.

*****

All the major ad exchanges are now owned by some of the biggest online media companies. AdX: Google. RMX: Yahoo! AdECN: Microsoft. They are no longer open markets, they are internal markets. As Yahoo! turns off Invite Media and everyone else contemplates the same, the media companies start to look like silos. Google's acquisition of Invite is the final clue. Invite is their e-Trade, the customer UI that allows easy access to their inventory. Whatever audience you're buying, Google can find it in their content network. So can Yahoo!, to an extent, and Microsoft and AOL and FAN and Akamai. If they don't happen to have an audience in house, they will buy order flow by subsidizing publishers to come into their content networks. Each of these companies can internalize all orders that come to them. They will not interoperate*** and they do not need to interoperate.

By internalizing, these media companies get to keep the transaction costs and keep their market activity quiet. They also get benefits that the brokerage houses aren't allowed--because the brokerage houses are regulated--like pushing their own inventory even if there is a better deal for their customer somewhere else.

How this will play out: the major media companies will each buy or build DSP-like capabilities to allow data-driven access to their inventory. They will build out their network of publishers so they can fulfill any audience request internally (internally here meaning either their own inventory or that of their enfiefed publishers.) At that point media buyers will be faced with an array of relatively undifferentiated media companies to buy from, each offering to best place the media buyer's ads in its own audience.

Sound familiar? This was exactly the situation of the media buyers four years ago, vis a vis the ad networks. We have taken our two steps forward and are now taking one back, to a closed world where media sellers protect their margins by obfuscating what they are selling. Not with the complete opacity of the ad networks, but through the inability of buyers to learn because they are kept apart from the data and segmentation that guides their buy.

Media buyers need to figure out how they can hold their own against the big media company market makers. They need to build, buy or closely partner with a DSP, one that is direct connected to all the large media companies and pub brokers, and lets the media buyers have their own proprietary data, algorithms and results.

Tomorrow's online ad buying world will look a lot like yesterday's, only with more technology.

*****

Prediction without predictions is just prattle, so here are some:
  1. There are not enough DSPs to go around. I count maybe ten indies that have technology up and running. A few more in the works that I know of. There are at least twice as many companies that will need to build or buy one. I don't expect more than two or three of the current indies to still be independent in 18 months.
  2. Yahoo! will realize it needs to buy order flow. It will bring in some premium ad networks to provide audience balance in RMX by buying or partnering.
  3. Direct connection between DSPs and pub brokers/publishers will proliferate, producing much fail among the technologically naive.
  4. Third-party ad exchanges will stop calling themselves that and start calling themselves what they are, pub brokers.
*****

We've had a lot of innovation in the last five years. It's starting to worry the entrenched players. Their reaction is to move us from innovation to integration. There is some good in this: allowing audience buying, dynamic optimization and RTB at the major media companies is a big step forward. But there is a lot of bad also. There is still a lot of innovation that needs to happen, especially on the optimization side. And the publishers that aren't big enough to be market-makers themselves are going to be even worse off than they are now.

An independent ad exchange--really a private crossing network with a clearinghouse function--needs to exist. It will allow innovation to continue outside of the spotlight. But it needs to rise up organically from the industry, because there's no money to be made, no exit. The New York Stock Exchange was formed as a cooperative by a group of brokers who needed interconnection and interoperability. They didn't support it because they thought the entity itself would be valuable, they did it to make their own businesses more valuable. What we need now is our very own Buttonwood Agreement with the same aims and similar methods.

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* A brief survey of the market microstructure issues around internalization is here. But read it for its discussion of transparency.
** The leading proponents of the recission of NYSE Rule 390 in 2000 were the big brokerage houses. Cynical voices said this was because they were also the largest investors in the ECNs. But it seems obvious from a remove that the investments in the ECNs arose from the same cause as the desire to get rid of 390: the desire to trade in private.
*** This is where the financial services analogy starts to fall apart. The big market-makers interoperate not just through the exchanges but through ECNs and private crossing networks. The reality of financial markets makes this necessary. There is not, at this stage, and won't be for some time, the same need for interoperability between, say, Google and Yahoo!